Introduction
Earlier papers dealing with fertility levels and trends in Iran have covered the period, 1972 (Abbasi-Shavazi 2000a ,b, 2001a ,b, 2002a . The primary objective of this paper is to update these results with the most recent data on the levels and trends of fertility in Iran as well as on rural and urban fertility and provincial-level variations. This paper covers the years from 1972 to 2000. Attention is given to the attainment of below-replacement fertility and the future of fertility in Iran.
Data and method
The 1986 and 1996 Censuses and the 2000 Iran Demographic and Health Survey (IDHS) are used to provide estimates of fertility levels and trends over the last three decades based on the own-children method. The own-children method is an indirect technique that uses the reverse-survival procedure to estimate fertility measures for the years prior to a census or household survey. Based on the information on the household record, children under the age of 15 are matched to women aged 15-64 in the same household, with the assumption that the women are the mothers of the children enumerated in the same household. This provides a table of all matched children by their own age and the age of their mothers at the time of the enumeration. An adjustment is made to include children where a match to a mother cannot be made. This is done on the assumption that the mothers of unmatched children have the same age distribution as the mothers of the matched children. A life table appropriate to the population is then used to reverse survive the children back over each of the 15 years proceeding the census or survey to obtain the number of births by age of mother in previous years. The numbers of women at each age at the enumeration are also reverse survived using the life table to obtain estimates of the numbers of women at each age in the population in each of the previous 15 years. Agespecific fertility rates and total fertility rates are then calculated for each year by dividing the number of reverse-survived births by the number of reverse-survived women. The details and the application of the technique have been elaborated elsewhere (Cho 1971 (Cho , 1973 Cho, Grabill and Bogue 1970; Cho, Retherford and Cho, 1986; Dugbaza 1994; Grabill and Cho 1965; Jain 1989; Rindfuss 1976 Rindfuss , 1977 Rindfuss and Sweet 1977; Retherford and Cho 1978; Retherford et al. 1979; Retherford, Cho and Kim 1984; Retherford and Thapa, 1999) . Abbasi-Shavazi (1999 , 2001c has given several reasons to justify the use of the ownchildren method in Iran. The reasons include the incompleteness of vital registration data and the improvement of Iranian census data, particularly age reporting (Saraie 1995; Mirzaie, Koosheshi and Naseri 1996; Keshtkar 2000) . Moreover, more than 95 per cent of children under 15 live with their natural mothers. Given the sharp decline in fertility in Iran in recent years, unlike other indirect methods of fertility estimation, the own-children method allows estimation of current fertility for a range of years prior to an enumeration. Accordingly, time trends and fluctuations in fertility can be measured.
Estimates of fertility obtained through the own-children method can be affected by age misreporting and under-enumeration. Single-year age distributions of the population of Iran in the 1976, 1986, 1996 Censuses and the IDHS were carefully analysed in an earlier paper (Abbasi-Shavazi 2001a). There were some signs of age heaping and digit preference at the 1976 Census, but progressively less so at the 1986 and 1996 Censuses. This conclusion applied to the province level as well as to the national level. Improvements in census coverage and age reporting have been documented by other studies (Leete and Alam 1997; Mirzaie et al. 1996) . The improvement in age reporting can be attributed to the rising levels of education as well as to the fact that the interviewers registered age on the basis of respondents' identity cards. This contributed greatly to the accuracy of age reporting at the 1996 Census. Despite modest age misreporting at single years of age, given that this study will estimate age-specific fertility rates in five-year age groups, the effects of age misreporting on the results are minimal. Careful analysis of the results showed that the rates for the single years, 1972, 1973, 1974, 1985 and 1986 based on the 1986 Census, are slightly under estimated. This is also true for the years 1982 and 1983 based on the 1996 Census. However, the main purpose of this paper is to present the overall trend of fertility over the period of the study, not single-year fluctuations. Singleyear fluctuations in such remote provinces as Sistan and Baluchistan, Hormozgan and Ilam are mainly due to age misreporting, and thus, provincial analysis for single-year trends should be made with care. Although the use of family planning methods was approved by Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979, the pre-revolutionary family planning program was suspended immediately after the Islamic Revolution. Although, no specific population policy was introduced after the revolution, the new government adopted a pronatalist approach. The legal minimum age at marriage for girls and boys was reduced from 15 and 18 to 13 and 15 years, respectively (Azimi 1981) 4 . The War with Iraq created a pronatalist atmosphere by which families were encouraged to have more children and economic incentives were provided. Despite this, the high fertility regime was short lived, and fertility started to decline by the mid1980s. TFR declined from 7.0 in 1980 to around 6.3 in 1986, and further to around 5.5 in 1988. The decline of fertility was slow until the government population policy was reversed and a new family planning program was officially inaugurated in December 1989. TFR fell sharply after 1988 dropping from 5.5 in 1988 to around 2.8 in 1996, a decline of almost 50 per cent in eight years (Table 2 Source: All age-specific and total fertility rates at national, rural-urban, and provincial levels in this paper were calculated by the first author using the own-children method applied to the 1986 and 1996 Censuses, and the 2000 Iran Demographic and Health Survey. Only figures for urban and rural areas at the national level during 1972-1986 are from Nourollahi (2000) .
Notes:
Minor inconsistencies between the rates for rural/urban areas and for the total population are due to different assumptions being used for the two figures. Figures for the three years preceding the 1986 Census are lower than the corresponding rates based on the 1996 Census, and this may be due to underreporting of children under two in the 1986 Census. The rates for the period 1986 and 1996 based on the IDHS are slightly higher than those from the 1996 Census. There are several possible explanations of these small differences including non-response, assumptions made about mortality levels in the past, small differences in the time references of the different measures and under-enumeration.
The 1986 and 1996 Censuses as well as the IDHS were conducted during October-November. Thus the rates for single years refer to 12-month periods prior to the enumeration. For example, the rate for 1980 refers to November 1979-October 1980. Table 2 .
Fertility trends in Iran over the past three decades, and particularly the sharp decline in recent years are interesting and deserve due attention for the following reasons. First, while other scholars have noted the rise and fall of Iranian fertility after the 1979 Revolution (Aghajanian 1991 (Aghajanian , 1995 Aghajanian and Mehryar 1999; Gholipour 1995a, 1995b; Saraie 1997; Mirzaie 1998 ), what has not been observed is the stability of the trend in the years before the revolution. This suggests that the fertility decline that commenced with the introduction of the family planning program in 1966 had lost its momentum in these years. Second, although the fertility decline accelerated from the 1990s with the reinstatement of the family planning program, the decline had commenced from 1985 onwards. Third, the very sharp fertility decline of fertility in Iran as an Islamic country is remarkable, particularly considering the socio-political situation in Iran in the 1980s.
Early evidence of the spectacular decline of fertility in Iran in the late 1980s and early 1990s was greeted with incredulity by many overseas observers as well as some demographers inside Iran (Abbasi-Shavazi et al. 2002) . The Five Year Development Plan in the late 1980s targeted a decline in TFR to 2.3 by 2010 and the family planning program was developed around this target. In reality, this target was achieved a decade earlier but, in 1993, Zanjani (1993) had argued that fertility would decline to only 3.85 byfertility had declined only slowly. He also pointed out that the family planning program in Iran was not coercive and, thus, it might not be as effective as had been planned. Clearly, prior to the 1996 Census, while some earlier evidence was available, demographers were unwilling to conclude that the fall in TFR in Iran was so rapid. In addition, much of the West was unaware of the demographic and social changes inside Iran. The international stereotype portrayed by the media was that Iran was a traditional society resistant to many aspects of social change, especially matters affecting women's lives such as family planning.
National trends: Age-specific fertility rates, 1972-2000
The own-children estimates of ASFRs for Iran from 1972 to 2000 based on the 1986 and 1996 censuses as well as the IDHS are shown in Table 3 . Figure 2 also shows the age specific fertility during the period, 1976-2000. The age patterns for the years 1976, 1980, 1986, 1990, 1996 and 2000 which are important turning points for the fertility transition in post-revolutionary Iran have been highlighted. 5 After the 1979 Revolution, Iran was internationally isolated by Western countries, and as a result, official statistics for population were not usually available or being used by international agencies. Thus, some of the statistics and demographic measures were based on estimates from data available prior to the revolution. Academic links between demographers inside Iran with scholars in the West were not effective. However, a few Iranian demographers were able to shed light on the post-revolutionary demographic transition in Iran through their publications. Of particular note were the works of Aghajanian (1991 and , Aghajanian and Mehryar (1999) , Ladier-Fouladi (1996) , Mirzaie (1998) , Roudi (1999 Roudi ( , 2002 , and Paydarfar (1987 Paydarfar ( , 1995 . However, Abbasi-Shavazi's analysis on fertility transition has been important in making the information available to international readers. First, it showed the trend of fertility for single years over the last three decades. It also provided trends at both the national and provincial levels. The findings of the Iranian fertility transition were presented at such international conferences as the IUSSP conferences in Bangladesh As depicted, marked differences in age patterns of fertility were apparent during these years. In 1976, the highest age-specific fertility rate was recorded for age group 20-24 (283 per 1000 women) followed by age groups 25-29 (268 per 1000 women) and 30-34 (231 per 1000 women). This age pattern remained in place in 1980 although fertility had risen overall. From 1976 and 1980, rises in fertility were evident for all age groups. However, during the first half of the 1980s, although the TFR remained high and nearly constant, the age pattern shifted towards later childbearing and the peak of childbearing occurred in age group 25-29. The falls in fertility at younger ages were matched by rises at older ages. Thus, Iranian women had a relatively early childbearing pattern in the first year of the revolution consistent with the pronatalist ideology adopted by the government. People had positive attitudes at the time of the revolution and were motivated to have more children early in their lives. This behaviour did not last long however and as age at first marriage increased, fertility shifted to a relatively later childbearing pattern. The figure depicts a decline in fertility from 1986 to 1990, particularly in the young age groups, 15-19, and 20-24 . Age specific fertility rates in age groups 25-29 and 30-34 were also lower in 1990 than those in 1986. However, there was a remarkable fall in fertility in all age groups during the 1990-96 period (Figure 2 ) due to the revival and successful implementation of the family planning program during this period. Age specific fertility rates continued to fall from 1996 to 2000, although the rate of decline was slower as there was less scope for further decline during this period. There was also an indication of a further shift towards delayed childbearing during the last period.
The steep fertility decline in all age groups between the periods suggests that simultaneously young couples were starting their childbearing later, married women were spacing their births further apart and older women were stopping their childbearing. This interpretation would explain the very sharp fall in total fertility that has occurred in Iran since the late 1980s.
Total fertility rates for rural and urban areas, 1972-2000
Trends of TFRs and ASFRs for rural and urban areas of Iran from 1972 to 2000 are shown in Figure 3 (see also Tables 4.1 and 4.2). As depicted, fertility rates were much higher in rural areas than in urban areas during the 1970s. This is consistent with the findings of earlier studies (Aghajanian 1991 (Aghajanian , 1995 Mehryar and Golipour 1995a; Mirzaie 1998) . Paidar-Nia (1977) had estimated that, in 1974, total fertility rates in rural and urban areas were 8.1 and 4.5, respectively. Table 2 .
Interestingly, fertility in both rural and urban areas started to increase two years before the revolution and peaked in 1979-80, suggesting that the family planning delivery system may have been starting to break down in the years prior to the revolution. Fertility then remained high and relatively flat until the mid-1980s. There was a gradual decline during 1986 and 1989, before the fertility transition in both rural and urban areas accelerated in the 1990s. The decline in rural areas was much steeper than in urban areas. The IDHS result showed that fertility continued to decline by the mid-1990s, although the trend in both rural and urban areas has slowed down recently. The large gap between TFRs in rural and urban areas has narrowed substantially. The total fertility rate in urban areas reached Age patterns of fertility for rural and urban areas Figure 4 shows ASFRs for rural-urban differences for the period 1976-2000, with highlighted figures for 1976, 1980, 1986, 1990, 1996 and 2000 . As the figure reveals, in general, the trends in age patterns of fertility for both rural and urban areas during the period were similar to the national level: large declines for all age groups with the largest declines being in the young age groups. By the end of the period, rates in rural areas were still falling at all ages, but the falls in urban areas had begun to slow down, especially at the older ages. Consequently, as with TFRs, the gaps between rural and urban areas had narrowed considerably by the end of the 1990s.
Fertility decline in both rural and areas has been observed in other developing countries, and particularly in South and West Asia as well as in the Middle East (Rashad 2000) .
What is interesting about the Iranian fertility transition, however, is the speed of fertility decline in rural areas in the recent decade. The similarity of the transition in both urban and rural areas is another feature characteristic of the fertility transition in Iran. The expansion of education and health networks in post-revolutionary Iran reduced the gap between rural and urban areas that was apparent prior to the revolution. This has contributed to the reduction of fertility in rural areas of Iran. 
Provincial fertility trends
Iran's population is heterogeneous in that in includes a number of ethnic groups. In addition to the majority Persian group, the main groups are Arab, Baluch, Kurd, Lore, Turk, and Turkmen. Three provinces in the northwest contain Turkish communities and two provinces in the west contain Kurdish communities. In the southern part of Iran, three provinces on the Persian Gulf contain a mixture of Arabs and Persians. Baluchi live in the province of Sistan-Baluchistan located in the South Eastern part of Iran, while Persians populate the central plateau of Iran. Although regional dialects are spoken, the official Farsi language is understood throughout the country. Around 99.5 per cent of the population is Muslim, the vast majority of whom (around 92 per cent) belong to the Shiite sect of Islam while the remaining eight per cent are Sunni. There is a strong overlap of ethnicity with religious sect as most of the non-Persian ethnic groups are mainly Sunni.
Until the early 1990s, Iran was administratively divided into 24 provinces (Ostans), but the number was increased to 26 in 1996, and to 28 in 2000 6 . Provinces vary markedly across various indices of socio-economic development (Mehryar and Gholipour 1995b; Mehryar and Tajdini 1998) . In general, Sistan-Baluchistan, Kogiloyeh-Boyerahmad, Ilam, West Azarbaijan and Kurdistan are considered to have a low level of socio-economic development while Tehran, Semnan, Gilan, Mazandaran, Esfahan, and Yazd are among the highly developed provinces. As a centralised society, there is also a pronounced geographical development pattern in Iran. Provinces at the borders of the country are usually less well developed, while those in the central areas and particularly those close to the capital, Tehran, are well developed.
Thus, it is interesting to examine whether fertility trends and patterns at the national level differ from those by province over the last three decades. In what follows, we will discuss trends of total fertility rates as well as age specific fertility rates across provinces. Total fertility rates by province from 1972 to 2000 based on the 1986 and 1996 censuses, and the 2000 IDHS are presented in Tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3, respectively. Given that the tables present TFRs for 28 provinces for 30 years, it is difficult to focus on individual provinces by single year. Thus, we discuss only the general findings of provincial-fertility differences and similarities for the period.
In general, the trends of fertility by province resemble those at the national level over the last three decades; a rise at the time of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, a turning point in the mid-1980s followed by a slow decline during the late 1980s and sharp decline during the 1990s. TFRs in all provinces started to decline in the mid-1980s, the exceptions being Gilan and East Azarbaijan where the transition had already been under way from 1982. The turning point in the mid-1980s is a national phenomenon and all provinces regardless of their level of development are included in this trend. In other words, demographic similarity has been observed across socio-economic diversity since the mid-1980s. There is some evidence that family planning services were being provided by the private sector and health network systems in the country from 1984. This might explain some of the decline, but the phenomenal shift from high fertility in 1984 in all provinces at the same time needs to be explained. It is also notable that fertility in all provinces declined even before the start of family planning program in 1988. Similar to the national trends, a sharp fall in fertility rates was observed in most provinces from 1989 onwards. The speed of the decline since 1989 is remarkable which may have been mainly due to the revival of the family planning program in 1988 and the associated endorsements of the program by prominent people in the country.
In addition, there were marked differences across provinces during the 1970s. A comparison of TFRs for provinces with those for the national average showed that women from most provinces displayed higher fertility, while only a few provinces had lower fertility than the national average in the 1970s and 1980s. However, due to the remarkable downward trend in fertility of most provinces since the late 1980s, provincial levels of fertility have converged to the national level by the end of the period (Figure 5) , and the provincial-fertility gap during the 1970s and 1980s, has now been narrowed substantially (see also Abbasi-Shavazi 2000a). Tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3, as well as Figure 5 , show the diversity of provinces in terms of the level of fertility during the 1972-2000 period. As can be seen, Sistan-Baluchistan stood out from other provinces with clearly the highest fertility from 1980 onwards (a startling 9.5 children per woman in the early 1980s), and the fertility decline there has continued to lag well behind the rest of the county. On the other hand, Tehran, Gilan and Semnan have displayed considerably lower fertility than the national average and all other provinces. Our analysis showed that Tehran City had the lowest fertility followed by Gilan, Mazandaran, Ghazvin, and Isfahan provinces while on the other hand, Sistan and Baluchistan province displayed the highest fertility followed by Hormozgan, Khoozistan, Kordestan, and West Azarbaijan as compared with all other provinces during the threeyear period 1998-2000. The very low fertility experienced by Tehran City from the early 1990s onwards is an indication of the possibility of reaching very low fertility in Iran, and particularly in urban areas in the future. To summarise, despite fertility variations among provinces during the period of the study, remarkable downward trends were clearly visible in all provinces. Despite the similarity in fertility trends, there are some differences among provinces. Those provinces with very high fertility declined sharply from 8.0 children per woman in the 1970s to around 3-4 children per woman in 1996. The speed of the decline in such low-fertility provinces as Gilan, Semnan, Tehran, Yazd and Mazandaran was less than that of the high-fertility provinces. The gap between the fertility of provinces with high fertility and the national average has narrowed substantially. As discussed, fertility decline and changes in reproductive patterns have become widespread in provinces of Iran since the mid-1980s.
Fertility differentials by province: age specific fertility rates, 1972-2000 Tables 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3, show ASFRs for all provinces during the periods 1975-1977, 1978-80, 1985-87, 1988-90, 1992-94, and 1998-2000 . These figures provide a clear trend and understanding of the unique fertility transition across Iran before and after the Islamic revolution.
The first point to be made is that the general shape of the age specific fertility curves is very similar across provinces. Also, overtime, the fertility pattern changed in broadly the same way across provinces. Between 1975-77 and 1978-80 , fertility rose in all provinces although the magnitude of the increase varied substantially among the provinces. The rise for such low fertility provinces as Gilan, Mazandaran and Isfahan was not significant, while such provinces as Booshehr, Ilam, West Azarbaijan, Kermanshah, Khooozistan, Khorasan, and Sistan and Baluchistan, characterized by a low level of development, experienced a considerable increase during the revolution. The increases in fertility were concentrated more at the peak ages of childbearing, 20-34 years.
In the ten-year period, 1978-80 to 1988-90, in the high fertility provinces, the rates at all ages tended to fall back to what they had been in 1975-77. On the other hand, the falls at each age were much more marked in this period for the low fertility provinces: Gilan, Markazi, Isfahan, and Mazandaran. The falls in these low fertility provinces tended to be concentrated in the peak ages of fertility, 20-34 years, rather than in the older ages, although falls are also evident for age group 15-19 in these provinces in this period.
In the next period, 1988-90 to 1992-94, large falls were evident in almost all provinces with more of a concentration at the older ages, as would be expected with the recommencement of the family planning program. In the final period, 1992-94 to 1998-2000, fertility at all ages continued to fall but this time with more emphasis on the two youngest age groups, 15-19 and 20-24. By the final period, age group 25-29 had been established as the peak age for fertility in almost all provinces. By the late 1990s, most provinces displayed relatively similar age patterns of fertility. Mohammad Jalal Abbasi-Shavazi and Peter McDonald 22 Rural and urban fertility by province Our results also show that, in general, the trends of TFRs for both rural and urban areas of the provinces were identical to the national level. Appendix Tables 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4 display the age-specific and total fertility rates for the selected periods based on the 1996 Census and the IDHS. Although, rural areas of most provinces had very high fertility by the early 1980s, their fertility fell sharply after the re-introduction of family planning program in 1989. The decline during the 1990s in rural areas was substantial and the age patterns of fertility in both areas of the same province are more-or-less similar.
Summary of fertility trends
While differences in levels of fertility are still evident across the country, these differences reflect those that already existed in the mid 1970s. However, the extent and speed of the fertility decline has been a nationwide phenomenon affecting all provinces, rural and urban in much the same way. The transition has been socially inclusive, that is, all provinces, regardless of their level of socio-economic development and their distance from the capital city, followed trends and patterns broadly similar to the national average across the periods. The remaining provinces with relatively high fertility tend to have small population numbers so that the effect of their high fertility on the national average is not very substantial. There is also a geographic pattern of fertility in Iran. Provinces located on the borders of the country are those that have had very high fertility, while provinces in the central part of Iran, particularly those close to the capital, Tehran, have displayed lower fertility. This provincial level pattern extends back at least to the mid-1970s.
The pattern and duration of these provincial differences suggest that their origins may be cultural (ethnicity and sect of religion). It seems likely that long-standing cultural differences between regions play a role in accounting for differences in the receptivity of contraceptive use and lower fertility but it is difficult to demonstrate such influences in conclusive or quantitative manner. The results of the Iran Fertility Transition Survey (Abbasi-Shavazi, are also suggestive of the potentially important role played by cultural factors in explaining differences in fertility across provinces. Nevertheless, the ubiquitous nature of fertility change over the past three decades means that we also need to identify common features within Iranian society that have facilitated the rapid spread of reproductive changes across regional boundaries.
Attainment of below-replacement fertility
Signs of the attainment of below-replacement fertility in Iran appeared in the first-half of the 1990s. The four developed provinces of Gilan, Semnan, Tehran and Isfahan reached a TFR of below-replacement level by the period 1994-1996 (Abbasi-Shavazi 2001a). The IDHS results also revealed that, by the end of the 1990s, below-replacement fertility was no longer the exception as around 50 per cent of provinces had had that experience. Gilan recorded the lowest fertility in 1998-2000, 1.7 births per woman, and the TFRs in such provinces as Esfahan (1.9), Ghazvin (1.8), Mazandaran (1.8) and Markazi (1.9) were below 2.0. Lower fertility was also apparent among other provinces as, out of 28 provinces, a further 22 had TFRs between 2 and 3 children per woman. Only two provinces, Hormozgan (3.1) and Sistan & Baluchistan (4.6) had TFRs above 3.0 (Table 6. 3). In Tehran City, the fertility rate was as low as 1.5. By the late 1990s, the low fertility pattern was not only characteristic of highly developed provinces or urban areas but was also evident in some, more remote rural areas. Our results show that the TFRs were below 2.0 in the urban parts of 14 provinces while 13 provinces had urban TFRs between 2.0 and 3.0. TFR remained high (4.1) in only the urban areas of Sistan and Baluchistan (Appendix Table 1 .4). Similarly, in rural areas, four provinces had TFRs below 2.0 while 19 provinces had TFRs between 2.0 and 3.0. Only 4 provinces had TFRs in their rural areas that were above 3.0 (Appendix Table 1 .2). The TFR for Iran as a whole was 2.2 during the same period, 1998-2000 and 2.0 in the year 2000.
These results are consistent with the findings of the Population Growth Estimation Survey (PGES) conducted in 1998 (Statistical Centre of Iran 1999). The PGES classified the provinces of Iran into five regions according to their mortality and fertility levels. The first region includes those provinces with the lowest fertility and mortality while the fifth region consists of those provinces with the highest levels of fertility and mortality. The five regions correspond closely to a classification by level of development, from highest to lowest. According to the 1998 PGES, the TFR for Iran as a whole was 2.06, while the TFRs in urban and rural areas were recorded as 1.88 and 2.39, respectively. Of the five regions included in the survey, three had replacement level fertility or below. The least developed regions, Regions 4 and 5, had TFRs of 2.4 and 2.9 (Table 7) . 
Number of births and the distribution of births by birth order
Registration statistics show that the number of births in Iran peaked in 1980, declined slightly during the period, 1981-1985, and continued to decline afterwards (Civil Registration Organization 2001; Ladier Fouladi 1997).
The changing distribution of women according to the number of their births provides useful insight into the fertility decline. Table 8 presents the percentage distribution of women aged 15-49 years by birth order for rural and urban areas in 1976 and 2000. It is apparent that the percentage with five or more births has drastically reduced from around 47.0 per cent in 1976 to around 30.0 per cent in 2000. The fall in the proportion of women with high parity has occurred in both rural and urban areas, although the percentage with five or more births in rural areas (38.0 per cent) was significantly higher than that in urban areas (25.0 per cent). As a result of the reduction of higher order births, there has been a sharp increase in the percentages of women with 1 and 2 births, and to some extent in the percentages of those with 3 and 4 births. In 2000, slightly more than one-third of women had one or two births. While the measures shown in Table 8 may be affected by shifts in the age structure of women within the age range 15-49 years, the movements observed are very large. 
The future of fertility in Iran
The main task of this paper has been to analyse fertility levels and trends over the last three decades. We have shown that fertility has declined sharply in Iran as a whole, and that rural and urban areas as well as all provinces have followed similar trends. We now turn to the question of plausible directions for the future of Iranian fertility. Will fertility in Iran rise again in the near future, will it level off at the current level, or will it decline further?
In what follows, we argue that Iran will experience slight fertility decline during the current decade before it levels off in the future. Necessarily the speed of the decline will be very slow as compared to the past decades. We will also speculate about the possibility of rising fertility in the future.
Continuing fertility decline
Several reasons justify further fertility decline in Iran during the current decade, 2000-2010. First, as discussed earlier, provincial as well as rural and urban differences in fertility are still evident in Iran. In the majority of provinces, the fertility level at the end of the 1990s was between 2.0 and 3.0. We can expect that fertility will continue to fall in this large group of provinces that have middle-range fertility at least to levels around 2.0 but even to levels below 2.0. This will be the main driving force for lower fertility in the country as a whole in the current decade. The cultural (religion and ethnicity) and socio-economic (education, level of economic development) factors that explain relatively higher fertility in Sistan Baluchistan, Hormozgan, and Ilam will remain pertinent and so we can expect that fertility will remain higher in these provinces than in other provinces in the future. Nevertheless, fertility in these provinces has been falling as well and so we can expect some continued decline. This will also tend to lower fertility at the national level.
Second, the continued process of urbanisation is another reason that lower fertility can be expected in the future. According to the 1996 Census, around 60 percent of the population were living in urban areas and it has been estimated that, by 2020, around 75 per cent of the population will live in urban areas.
Third, the level of education is increasing rapidly. Children of all social classes, particularly the poor, have access to education, and the small educational differences in the society will be reduced further in the future. The level of education of young women has increased over the last two decades and the gap between male and female education has narrowed substantially (Abdollahyan 2004 ). This has resulted in increased gender equity within the household in Iran and women have the major role in fertility decision-making. Although the level of female employment is still low, given the 'rising expectation' for Iranian women (Shadi-Talab 2001) , it is likely that the level of women's labour force participation will increase in the future. Age at first marriage for women is also increasing significantly as a result of the increases in women's education. Doroudi-Ahi (2001) has shown that there is a sex imbalance in the marriage ages in Iran; that is, the number of women in the marriage ages is higher than that for men. This is due to the post-revolutionary baby boom by which the number of men in older cohorts who were born before the revolution is much smaller than the number of women of younger cohorts who are the babies of the early post-revolution years. Brides will be much less in demand as the cohort size rises and hence a lower proportion may marry or they will marry men more their own age. This will increase the age at marriage for women at least for the current decade.
For men in particular, as the decade progresses, the very large, post-revolutionary birth cohort will experience a highly competitive labour market. This will mean that they will need to invest even more in job searching and the building of their own human capital through education and work experience. It also means that their actual standard of living may fall below their aspirations. This process tends to delay family formation and will be another factor likely to contribute to lower fertility (Easterlin 1976 ).
The higher status of women in Iran will also tend have a negative effect on fertility in the future. This is in line with the 'gender equity' argument made by McDonald (2000) , and supports Dyson's (2002) hypothesis that one of the main factor of the fall of fertility in developing countries is that 'women become more like men'. Shadi-Talab (2001) has also noted that "Iranian girls gradually practice democracy within the family, and patriarchal power is slowly diminishing. Although, attitude change is a very slow process, the interaction between education and changes in norms and value system is observable in the share of girls participation at universities from the most deprived provinces and far from their home town." Commenting on gender equality in Iran, Mir-Hosseini (2002: 95) expressed that 'the presidential elections of 1997 showed that no political tendency can ignore the new generation of women who have come of age during the life of the Islamic Republic and who are demanding equal opportunities and rights on all fronts. Women are now a force that must be reckoned with" (see also, Kian-Thiebaut 2002: 56-73) .
Fourth, as Caldwell, Caldwell and McDonald (2000) have argued, the contributions of governments to population control in Asian countries have been very important. The very large, post-revolutionary baby boom will itself start having children in the 2000-2010 decade and, even with low fertility, this will lead to a considerable increase in the number of births compared to recent years. Because of this 'echo effect', the decade has been described as "the decade of population crisis" [daha-e bohran-e jamiyyat] in Iran. The Iranian Government has indicated its determination to limit the number of births in this decade. All responsible government departments and institutions, as well as NGO's are committed to this policy. Numerous brochures and pamphlets have been distributed in family planning departments. A two-child policy [two is enough] is advertised everywhere; in bus stops, public spaces, parks, cinemas, and even on children's toys and chocolate boxes! Population and family planning is being taught as a compulsory unit to all university students. All the efforts are concentrated on the improvement of health, the expansion of reproductive health services, as well as the reduction of fertility in rural areas and the provinces with high fertility. These programs will not only affect the attitudes of childbearing women, but also will shape the fertility attitudes and behavior of the young generations.
The results of qualitative research on fertility behavior of women in Yazd province (Abbasi Shavazi et al. 2002) as well as the results of the Iran Fertility Survey (Abbasi-Shavazi, have shown that most women who had a low level of education preferred to have only two or three children, and there was no difference between place of residence (rural and urban areas) as well as the economic status of the women. We have even found a strong preference for one child as an ideal among women in Gilan Province. This confirms that there has been widespread ideational shift towards a small family size norm.
Furthermore, the effectiveness of family planning methods is another factor supporting further fertility decline. According to the IDHS, the contraceptive prevalence rate was around 72 per cent in 2000. There exists a small gap between the level of CPR in rural and urban areas. However, a significant proportion of pregnancies (around 33 per cent) were still unintended. Of these, around 18 per cent were unwanted and 15 percent were mistimed . With the improvement of the quality of the family planning services, the level of unwanted pregnancies is likely to be reduced, and thus, fertility will decline further. On the other hand, current patterns of behaviour mean that many Iranian women plan to complete their fertility at a relatively young age (mid 20s) at which ages, sterilisations are generally not available. This can mean an increased risk of having an unwanted pregnancy.
Finally, as Chesnais (2000: 126) argued, the impact of globalization on social life in other countries should not be ignored. No specific country or region can be seen in isolation from other countries in the exchange of ideas and culture today. However, Iranian society is less open to such influences than many other countries.
The possibility of rising fertility
Will Iran or any of its provinces experience an increase in their fertility in the future? Some believe that economic hardship will end soon and then people will compensate for their low fertility. This seems an overly optimistic assessment of the economic future of the coming young generations and, in any case, what counts is economic status relative to economic aspirations and there is lots of evidence to suggest that aspirations of young people are running well ahead of the likelihood that they will achieve their aspirations.
The other proposition is that the low fertility that has been observed may be temporary. The reason is that fertility has fallen simultaneously at all ages. The low fertility of the older women may have been a response to past high fertility. However, it is possible that those now experiencing low fertility in their 20s, will in their thirties, have higher fertility than women who are now in their thirties. If this happens, there would be a tendency for the TFR to rise over time. This is described by demographers as a tempo effect. However, given the high level of education and the change of values for the young generation, it is unlikely that couples will change their fertility behaviour in the future. In addition, women of the postrevolutionary baby boom who will start their childbearing in the present decade have a smaller ideal family size, and thus, the proposed tempo effect may not be large. While increases in fertility have been observed in some highly industrialised countries since the mid 1980s (all Nordic countries, France, the United States) and these increases may have been due to a tempo effect, the increases have been small. At the same time, many other countries in the same category have not yet experienced a tempo effect although their fertility has been below replacement for many years (Germany, Japan, Southern Europe). Thus, the state of knowledge of the behaviour of populations subsequent to the attainment of below replacement fertility is still unpredictable. Germany's fertility has been below replacement for 35 years. Hence, tempo effects can be longer than a researcher's lifetime in their coming.
It may also be possible that, with the rapid fall of the fertility, the government will lose its interests in population control, or adopt a pronatalist policy in the future. Caldwell, Caldwell and McDonald (2000) note that low levels of fertility in some developing countries have caused surprisingly little reaction outside academic circles. They state that one reason for the slow government reactions is "population momentum; the fact that age structures are still adjusting to the relatively new low fertility levels and in most cases will not fully adjust for decades". Given that Iran is faced with the prospect of a "post-revolutionary baby boom", no official policies are likely to be implemented with regard to low fertility. Thus, the possibility of Iran adopting pronatalist policies in the near future is unlikely.
The other reason why low fertility may not attract policy attention in the near future is the fact that not all provinces have experienced below-replacement fertility. Some provinces, particularly in rural areas, still have higher fertility than the national level. Besides, some government officials and experts believe that the current low level of fertility is due mainly to recent economic hardship, and thus fertility may rise again after this economic hardship is over.
Even if the government were to introduce a pronatalist policy, it may not affect people's fertility decision making easily. Women who were interviewed in the Iran Fertility Transition Survey indicated that they would not increase their fertility even if the government provided incentives to do so. Economic factors have been involved in the onset of fertility decline, but the small family size has become a norm in the society. The level of future fertility in Iran depends upon the decisions that will be made by the current and the next generation. If the coming generations come to the conclusion that having a small family size will disadvantage them, then they may decide to increase their fertility. However, given the experience of the advanced countries today, it is unlikely that the fertility will simply increase in the future. Once the small family size norms internalises, it is difficult to change it at least in the relatively short term.
Some may argue that with the presence of sex preference in the society, fertility is likely to remain high and/or will not decline further. Recent statistics have shown that sex preference, and particularly son preference, is no longer an issue in fertility decision-making. Women interviewed in the IDHS (Ministry of Health and Medical Education 2002) were asked about their attitudes on the sex of their next child. The majority of the women did not have any sex preference for their future births. Interestingly, among the women who had a sex preference, a higher proportion indicated that they would prefer a girl to a boy. This is counter to the generally held view that son preference is one of the factors of high fertility in developing countries in general, and Asian countries in particular.
On balance, the above discussion indicates that our view is that fertility in Iran is likely to continue to fall in the present decade and is likely to remain low for the foreseeable future.
Summary and discussion
Fertility trends in Iran over the last three decades have been reviewed in this paper. The total fertility rate declined moderately during the early 1970s, before it rose in the years surrounding the revolution. The suspension of the family planning program contributed to the higher fertility in these years. The early years after the 1979 revolution were marked by the effectively pronatalist approach taken by the Islamic government, although no specific population policy was introduced. The pronataist ideology seems to have had a small impact on fertility for a few years during the early 1980s, however, it also seems that couples started to control their fertility by the mid-1980s, well before the revival of the family planning program in 1989. Kaveh-Firouz and Abbasi-Shavazi (2004) have argued that implicit policies of the government such as the improvement of the health system, rural development and the expansion of education throughout the country indirectly contributed to the onset of the fertility decline in the 1980s, and undoubtedly helped the success of family planning program in the 1990s.
A few observations can be made from this paper. First, the speed and age-specific pattern of the decline was a nationwide phenomenon. Second, the transition has been socially inclusive; that is all provinces, regardless of their level of socio-economic development and their distance from the capital city, closely followed trends and patterns that were similar to the national level. Third, the fertility transition in Iran occurred somewhat independently of official population policies. Fertility rose even before the stopping of the family planning program in 1979 and started to decline by the mid-1980s, before the inauguration of the official family planning program in 1988. Fertility rose from the early half of the 1970s to the early half of the 1980s by around 20-30 per cent, reaching a peak in 1984. Subsequently, it has fallen by around 70 per cent. Fertility has fallen to below replacement level in some provinces and to below 3.0 in almost all provinces. Despite the phenomenal decline of fertility in all provinces of Iran, some differentials remain across the country. Provinces located on the borders of the country have had relatively higher fertility while provinces in the central part of Iran, particularly those close to the capital, Tehran, have displayed lower fertility. This reflects both ethnic and religious differences and differing levels of socio-economic development. However, the few provinces with high fertility also have small population sizes so the effect of their high fertility on the national average has not been very substantial.
A number of important aspects of the Iranian fertility decline need to be dealt with in any comprehensive explanation. One is the fact that the decline began before the shift to an antinatalist policy. Another is the pervasiveness of the fertility decline. Unlike the early stages of fertility transitions in many countries, there is no evidence of selective declines at the young and old extremes of the childbearing ages, but rather a decline across all age groups. Likewise, there is no evidence of diffusion of fertility decline from urban to rural areas, but rather a simultaneous and substantial decline across all geographic regions and in both urban and rural areas. Over time, there was a considerable degree of narrowing of urban-rural and regional differences both in fertility levels and in contraceptive prevalence rates.
While the early years of the revolution produced a psychology conducive to higher fertility, the effect was temporary as confirmed by the fact that fertility in Iran began to decline as early as 1984, well before the official inauguration of the family planning program in 1989. In the most advanced provinces (those with the lowest fertility then and now), there was no rise in fertility in the early years of the revolution suggesting that they were not influenced by the effectively pronatalist policies of the time. Why has the Iranian family planning program been so successful in such a short time? In what follows, we argue that the social and cultural context of the society along with certain government policies such as rural development, health improvement, and the rise of literacy paved the way for a successful family planning program introduced by the Islamic government.
Government policies such as the extension of public education, particularly for girls, the establishment of the health network system, and the increase in access to electricity and safe water, transport and communication in remote areas of Iran all are likely to have had an indirect effect on fertility decline. High aspirations and investments by families in their children's schooling are also likely to have affected couples' fertility decision making. Iranian girls and women stay more years in school and university than was the case previously and this factor delays marriage and childbearing. The level of education for women at reproductive ages has increased substantially over the last four decades, and the education gap between rural and urban areas has narrowed considerably.
Furthermore, the official program introduced by the government in 1989 enjoyed the support of religious leaders. Some religious leaders were opposed to the first family planning program implemented before the revolution. However, Ayatollah Khomeini issued the first approval for the use of family planning methods in 1979. Despite this, the family planning program was suspended after the revolution, but studies have shown that family planning services were available through clinics during the early 1980s (Mehryar et al. 2001) . The support of religious leaders in the late 1980s legitimised the family planning program, and the government provided family planning services to people with religious support.
The decline in infant mortality was also likely to be an important factor in the demand for fewer births and a smaller family size. The infant mortality rate declined from around 114 per 1000 live births in 1975 to 65 per 1000 in 1986, and 29 in 2000. The establishment of the health network system and its extension to rural and deprived areas of the country has been one of the key factors in reducing infant mortality (Abbasi-Shavazi et al. Fourthcoming) . Urbanisation has also contributed to the decline as, by 1996, more than 60 per cent of the population, were living in urban areas.
However, there are indications that the impacts of government policy were only part of the story. Interestingly, in spite of an active campaign by a variety of official and unofficial organizations in favour of early marriage and reproduction as well as the presence of strong economic and social incentives for marrying early and having children, the age at first marriage increased during the early 1980s (Abbasi-Shavazi 2000b). Fertility also clearly began its fall prior to the introduction of the government's family planning program.
There is a strong case that economic hardship relative to material aspirations accelerated the fall in fertility in Iran from the mid-1980s. Economic pressure has been a major factor in the postponement of marriage. Although the revolution gave rise to increased economic aspirations through its promise that wealth would be more widely shared across the society, in reality, Iran experienced increased economic hardship after the revolution, particularly in the decade after the War with Iraq. Further, lack of economic progress has meant that the cost of living has risen dramatically in recent years. Young people tend to delay their marriage until they get a salaried job to be able to afford the high living costs. The increasing cost of rearing children, particularly the cost of education, is another important factor in family decisionmaking.
The weight of argument seems to be strongly in the direction that fertility in Iran will continue to fall in the present decade and, maybe, beyond this decade. It is likely that regional differences in fertility will continue to narrow and that the economic pressure on young people will increase as the very large, post-revolutionary cohorts attempt to enter the labour market. As a result, they can be expected to spend more years in education and more time working before marriage. Migration to the lower-fertility, urban areas will continue. The demand for (and cost of) housing will also rise as this large generation attempts to form its own families. At the same time, there will be no fall in economic aspirations; indeed, aspirations are likely to continue to rise particularly through exposure to standards in other countries. This is highly likely to give rise to increases in age at marriage while, at the same time, the imbalance in the sexes caused by the large post-revolutionary cohort, will also lead to later marriage. Postponement of first births will be the outcome and this will draw down the fertility rate in the present decade. As age at marriage in Iran is presently low by world standards, there is considerable scope for increase. Thus, a shift towards later childbearing could extend over a long period of time keeping fertility low during those years. It is also likely that cost pressures will induce families to limit the number of their children to two and this has become government policy as well. The two-child norm is now widely advertised and promoted by government. A long period of below replacement fertility that corresponds with the years in which the very large post-revolutionary birth cohort passes through the childbearing years would be a favourable outcome for Iranian development as it would limit the expected rise in births ensuing from the baby-boom generation's echo effect, so long as this does not lead to social entrenchment of very low fertility (under 1.5 births per woman).
